{"id":60,"date":"2006-06-16T15:44:39","date_gmt":"2006-06-16T19:44:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/?p=60"},"modified":"2009-03-20T07:45:16","modified_gmt":"2009-03-20T11:45:16","slug":"a-deeper-insight-into-security-crypto-gram","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/2006\/06\/16\/a-deeper-insight-into-security-crypto-gram\/","title":{"rendered":"A deeper insight into security &#8211; CRYPTO-GRAM"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Here&#8217;s a reprint of Crypto-Gram by Bruce Schneier. His newsletter is one of the most read on the subject. It is a strongly recommended reading for all who care about themselves and others.<\/p>\n<p>Schneier also gives a good insight into how to motivate security in any area. (See  Aligning Interest with Capability, below.) <\/p>\n<p>Here in it&#8217;s entirety is:<\/p>\n<p>CRYPTO-GRAM<\/p>\n<p>                 June 15, 2006<\/p>\n<p>               by Bruce Schneier<br \/>\n                Founder and CTO<br \/>\n       Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.<br \/>\n            schneier@counterpane.com<br \/>\n             http:\/\/www.schneier.com<br \/>\n            http:\/\/www.counterpane.com<\/p>\n<p>A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and<br \/>\ncommentaries on security: computer and otherwise.<\/p>\n<p>For back issues, or to subscribe, visit<br \/>\n<http:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram.html>.<\/p>\n<p>You can read this issue on the web at<br \/>\n<http:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0606.html>.  These same essays<br \/>\nappear in the &#8220;Schneier on Security&#8221; blog:<br \/>\n<http:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog>.  An RSS feed is available.<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>In this issue:<br \/>\n      The Value of Privacy<br \/>\n      Movie-Plot Threat Contest Winner<br \/>\n      Crypto-Gram Reprints<br \/>\n      Diebold Doesn&#8217;t Understand the Security Threat<br \/>\n      News<br \/>\n      Hacking Computers Over USB<br \/>\n      The Doghouse: KRYPTO 2.0<br \/>\n      Counterpane News<br \/>\n      Aligning Interest with Capability<br \/>\n      Comments from Readers<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>      The Value of Privacy<\/p>\n<p>Last month, revelation of yet another NSA surveillance effort against<br \/>\nthe American people rekindled the privacy debate.  Those in favor of<br \/>\nthese programs have trotted out the same rhetorical question we hear<br \/>\nevery time privacy advocates oppose ID checks, video cameras, massive<br \/>\ndatabases, data mining, and other wholesale surveillance measures: &#8220;If<br \/>\nyou aren&#8217;t doing anything wrong, what do you have to hide?&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Some clever answers: &#8220;If I&#8217;m not doing anything wrong, then you have no<br \/>\ncause to watch me.&#8221; &#8220;Because the government gets to define what&#8217;s<br \/>\nwrong, and they keep changing the definition.&#8221; &#8220;Because you might do<br \/>\nsomething wrong with my information.&#8221; My problem with quips like these<br \/>\n&#8212; as right as they are &#8212; is that they accept the premise that privacy<br \/>\nis about hiding a wrong. It&#8217;s not. Privacy is an inherent human right,<br \/>\nand a requirement for maintaining the human condition with dignity and<br \/>\nrespect.<\/p>\n<p>Two proverbs say it best: &#8220;Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?&#8221; (&#8220;Who<br \/>\nwatches the watchers?&#8221;) and &#8220;Absolute power corrupts absolutely.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Cardinal Richelieu understood the value of surveillance when he<br \/>\nfamously said, &#8220;If one would give me six lines written by the hand of<br \/>\nthe most honest man, I would find something in them to have him<br \/>\nhanged.&#8221; Watch someone long enough, and you&#8217;ll find something to arrest<br \/>\n&#8212; or just blackmail &#8212; him with. Privacy is important because without<br \/>\nit, surveillance information will be abused: to peep, to sell to<br \/>\nmarketers, and to spy on political enemies &#8212; whoever they happen to be<br \/>\nat the time.<\/p>\n<p>Privacy protects us from abuses by those in power, even if we&#8217;re doing<br \/>\nnothing wrong at the time of surveillance.<\/p>\n<p>We do nothing wrong when we make love or go to the bathroom. We are not<br \/>\ndeliberately hiding anything when we seek out private places for<br \/>\nreflection or conversation. We keep private journals, sing in the<br \/>\nprivacy of the shower, and write letters to secret lovers and then burn<br \/>\nthem. Privacy is a basic human need.<\/p>\n<p>A future in which privacy would face constant assault was so alien to<br \/>\nthe framers of the Constitution that it never occurred to them to call<br \/>\nout privacy as an explicit right. Privacy was inherent to the nobility<br \/>\nof their being and their cause. Of course being watched in your own<br \/>\nhome was unreasonable. Watching at all was an act so unseemly as to be<br \/>\ninconceivable among gentlemen in their day. You watched convicted<br \/>\ncriminals, not free citizens. You ruled your own home. It&#8217;s intrinsic<br \/>\nto the concept of liberty.<\/p>\n<p>For if we are observed in all matters, we are constantly under threat<br \/>\nof correction, judgment, criticism, even plagiarism of our own<br \/>\nuniqueness. We become children, fettered under watchful eyes,<br \/>\nconstantly fearful that &#8212; either now or in the uncertain future &#8212;<br \/>\npatterns we leave behind will be brought back to implicate us, by<br \/>\nwhatever authority has now become focused upon our once-private and<br \/>\ninnocent acts. We lose our individuality, because everything we do is<br \/>\nobservable and recordable.<\/p>\n<p>How many of us have paused during conversations in the past<br \/>\nfour-and-a-half years, suddenly aware that we might be eavesdropped on?<br \/>\nProbably it was a phone conversation, although maybe it was an e-mail<br \/>\nor instant message exchange or a conversation in a public place. Maybe<br \/>\nthe topic was terrorism, or politics, or Islam. We stop suddenly,<br \/>\nmomentarily afraid that our words might be taken out of context, then<br \/>\nwe laugh at our paranoia and go on. But our demeanor has changed, and<br \/>\nour words are subtly altered.<\/p>\n<p>This is the loss of freedom we face when our privacy is taken from us.<br \/>\nThis was life in the former East Germany, or life in Saddam Hussein&#8217;s<br \/>\nIraq. And it&#8217;s our future as we allow an ever-intrusive eye into our<br \/>\npersonal, private lives.<\/p>\n<p>Too many wrongly characterize the debate as &#8220;security versus privacy.&#8221;<br \/>\nThe real choice is liberty versus control. Tyranny, whether it arises<br \/>\nunder threat of foreign physical attack or under constant domestic<br \/>\nauthoritative scrutiny, is still tyranny. Liberty requires security<br \/>\nwithout intrusion, security plus privacy. Widespread police<br \/>\nsurveillance is the very definition of a police state. And that&#8217;s why<br \/>\nwe should champion privacy even when we have nothing to hide.<\/p>\n<p>A version of this essay originally appeared on Wired.com.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.wired.com\/news\/columns\/0,70886-0.html<\/p>\n<p>Daniel Solove comments:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.concurringopinions.com\/archives\/2006\/05\/is_there_a_good.html<br \/>\nor http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/nmj3u<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>      Movie-Plot Threat Contest Winner<\/p>\n<p>I can tell you one thing, you guys are really imaginative.  The<br \/>\nresponse to my Movie-Plot Threat Contest was more than I could imagine:<br \/>\n892 comments.  I printed them all out &#8212; 195 pages, double sided &#8212; and<br \/>\nspiral bound them, so I could read them more easily.  The cover read:<br \/>\n&#8220;The Big Book of Terrorist Plots.&#8221;  I tried not to wave it around too<br \/>\nmuch in airports.<\/p>\n<p>I almost didn&#8217;t want to pick a winner, because the real point is the<br \/>\nenormous list of them all.  And because it&#8217;s hard to choose.  But after<br \/>\ncareful deliberation, the winning entry is by Tom Grant.  Although<br \/>\nplanes filled with explosives is already cliche, destroying the Grand<br \/>\nCoulee Dam is inspired.  Here it is:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Mission: Terrorize Americans. Neutralize American economy, make<br \/>\nAmerica feel completely vulnerable, and all Americans unsafe.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 1: A rented van drives from Spokane, WA, to a remote setting in<br \/>\nIdaho and loads up with shoulder-mounted rocket launchers and a couple<br \/>\nof people dressed in fatigues.  <\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 2:  Terrorists dressed in &#8216;delivery man&#8217; garb take over the UPS<br \/>\ncargo depot at the Spokane, WA, airport. A van full of explosives is<br \/>\nunloaded at the depot.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 3:  Terrorists dressed in &#8216;delivery man&#8217; garb take over the UPS<br \/>\ncargo depot at the Kamloops, BC, airport. A van full of explosives is<br \/>\nunloaded at the depot.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 4:  A van with mercenaries drives through the Idaho forests en<br \/>\nroute to an unknown destination. Receives cell communiqu\u00c3\u00a9 that<br \/>\nlocations Alpha and Bravo are secured.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 5:  UPS cargo plane lands in Kamloops and is met at the depot by<br \/>\nterrorists who overtake the plane and its crew. Explosives are loaded<br \/>\naboard the aircraft.  The same scene plays out in Spokane moments<br \/>\nlater, and that plane is loaded with explosives.   Two pilots board<br \/>\neach of the cargo planes and ask for takeoff instructions as night<br \/>\nfalls across the West.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 6:  Two cargo jets go airborne from two separate locations.  A<br \/>\nvan with four terrorists arrives at its destination, parked on an<br \/>\noverlook ridge just after nightfall. They use infrared glasses to scope<br \/>\nthe target. The camera pans down and away from the van, exposing the<br \/>\ntarget. Grand Coulee Dam.  The cell phone rings and notification comes<br \/>\nto the leader that &#8216;Nighthawks alpha and bravo have launched.&#8217;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 7:  Two radar operators in separate locations note with alarm<br \/>\nthat UPS cargo jets they have been tracking have dropped off the radar<br \/>\nand may have crashed.  Aboard each craft the pilots have turned off<br \/>\nnavigational radios and are flying on &#8216;manual&#8217; at low altitude. One<br \/>\nheading South, one heading North.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 8:  Planes are closing in on the &#8216;target&#8217; and the rocket<br \/>\nlauncher crew goes to work. With precision they strike lookout and<br \/>\ndefense positions on the dam, then target the office structures<br \/>\nbelow.  As they finish, a cargo jet approaches from the North at high<br \/>\nvelocity, slamming into the back side of the dam just above the<br \/>\nwaterline and exploding, shuddering the earth. A large portion of the<br \/>\ncenter-top of the dam is missing. Within seconds a cargo plane coming<br \/>\nfrom the South slams into the front face of the dam, closer to the<br \/>\nbase, and explodes in a blinding flash, shuddering the earth.  In<br \/>\nmoments, the dam begins to fail, and a final volley from four rocket<br \/>\nlaunchers on the hill above helps break open the face of the dam.  The<br \/>\n40-mile-long Lake Roosevelt begins to pour down the Columbia River<br \/>\nValley, uncontrolled. No warning is given to the dams downriver, other<br \/>\nthan the generation at G.C. is now offline.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 9:  Through the night, the surging wall of water roars down the<br \/>\nColumbia waterway, overtopping dam after dam and gaining momentum (and<br \/>\nhuge amounts of water) along the way. The cities of Wenatchee and<br \/>\nKennewick are inundated and largely swept away.  A van of renegades<br \/>\nretreats to Northern Idaho to hide.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 10:  As day breaks in the West, there is no power from Seattle<br \/>\nto Los Angeles. The Western power grid has failed.  Commerce has ground<br \/>\nto a halt west of the Rocky Mountains.  Water is sweeping down the<br \/>\nColumbia River gorge, threatening to overtop Bonneville dam and wipe<br \/>\nout the large metro area of Portland, OR.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 11:  Bin Laden releases a video on Al Jazeera that claims<br \/>\nvictory over the Americans.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 12:  Pandemonium, as water sweeps into a panicked Portland,<br \/>\nOregon, washing all away in its path, and surging water well up the<br \/>\nWillamette valley.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 13:  Washington situation room&#8230;little input is coming in from<br \/>\nthe West. Some military bases have emergency power and sat phones, and<br \/>\nare reporting that the devastation of the dam infrastructure is<br \/>\ncomplete. Seven major and five minor dams have been destroyed.<br \/>\nRe-powering the West coast will take months, as connections from the<br \/>\nEastern grid will have to be made through the New Mexico Mountains.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Scene 14:  Worst U.S. market crash in history. America&#8217;s GNP drops<br \/>\nfrom the top of the charts to 20th worldwide. Exports and imports cease<br \/>\non the West coast. Martial law fails to control mass exodus from<br \/>\nSeattle, San Francisco, and L.A. as millions flee to the east. Gas<br \/>\nshortages and vigilante mentality take their toll on the panicked<br \/>\npopulace. The West is &#8216;wild&#8217; once more. The East is overrun with<br \/>\nmillions seeking homes and employment.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Congratulations, Tom.  I&#8217;m still trying to figure out what you win.<\/p>\n<p>Contest rules and all entries:<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"xu5S9KphBS\"><p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog\/archives\/2006\/04\/announcing_movi.html\">Announcing:  Movie-Plot Threat Contest<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" style=\"position: absolute; clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);\" title=\"&#8220;Announcing:  Movie-Plot Threat Contest&#8221; &#8212; Schneier on Security\" src=\"https:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog\/archives\/2006\/04\/announcing_movi.html\/embed\/#?secret=KWprVSlVNx#?secret=xu5S9KphBS\" data-secret=\"xu5S9KphBS\" width=\"540\" height=\"304\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>Update, including selection criteria:<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"uPPpz34APo\"><p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog\/archives\/2006\/04\/movie_plot_thre.html\">Movie Plot Threat Contest: Status Report<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" style=\"position: absolute; clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);\" title=\"&#8220;Movie Plot Threat Contest: Status Report&#8221; &#8212; Schneier on Security\" src=\"https:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog\/archives\/2006\/04\/movie_plot_thre.html\/embed\/#?secret=ZoGe4fvjNC#?secret=uPPpz34APo\" data-secret=\"uPPpz34APo\" width=\"540\" height=\"304\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>Winning entry:<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"hblukx25rn\"><p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog\/archives\/2006\/04\/announcing_movi.html\">Announcing:  Movie-Plot Threat Contest<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" style=\"position: absolute; clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);\" title=\"&#8220;Announcing:  Movie-Plot Threat Contest&#8221; &#8212; Schneier on Security\" src=\"https:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog\/archives\/2006\/04\/announcing_movi.html\/embed\/#?secret=nIpYl9T0nK#?secret=hblukx25rn\" data-secret=\"hblukx25rn\" width=\"540\" height=\"304\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>      Crypto-Gram Reprints<\/p>\n<p>Crypto-Gram is currently in its ninth year of publication.  Back issues<br \/>\ncover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found on<br \/>\n<http:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-back.html>.  These are a selection<br \/>\nof articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years.<\/p>\n<p>Internet Attack Trends:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0506.html#1<\/p>\n<p>U.S. Medical Privacy Law Gutted:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0506.html#9<\/p>\n<p>Breaking Iranian Codes:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0406.html#1<\/p>\n<p>The Witty Worm:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0406.html#9<\/p>\n<p>The Risks Of Cyberterrorism:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0306.html#1<\/p>\n<p>Fixing Intelligence Failures:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com.\/crypto-gram-0206.html#1<\/p>\n<p>Honeypots and the Honeynet Project<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0106.html#1<\/p>\n<p>Microsoft SOAP:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0006.html#SOAP<\/p>\n<p>The Data Encryption Standard (DES):<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-0006.html#DES<\/p>\n<p>The internationalization of cryptography policy:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-9906.html#policy<br \/>\nand products:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-9906.html#products<\/p>\n<p>The new breeds of viruses, worms, and other malware:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-9906.html#viruses<\/p>\n<p>Timing attacks, power analysis, and other &#8220;side-channel&#8221; attacks<br \/>\nagainst cryptosystems:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram-9806.html#side<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>In the long term, corporate data mining efforts are more of a privacy<br \/>\nrisk than government data mining efforts.  And here&#8217;s an off-the-shelf<br \/>\nproduct from IBM:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www-306.ibm.com\/common\/ssi\/fcgi-bin\/ssialias?subtype=ca&#038;infotype=<br \/>\nan&#038;appname=iSource&#038;supplier=649&#038;letternum=ENUSA06-0519 or<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/tinyurl.com\/q29er<\/p>\n<p>The UK Intelligence and Security Committee has issued a report on the<br \/>\nJuly 7 terrorist bombings in London:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk\/publications\/reports\/intelligence\/isc_7j<br \/>\nuly_report.pdf or http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/hazzn<br \/>\nThe UK government has issued a response:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk\/publications\/reports\/intelligence\/govres<br \/>\n_7july.pdf or http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/j8q5x<br \/>\nAbout the Intelligence and Security Committee:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk\/intelligence\/index.asp<\/p>\n<p> From a list of 100,000 passwords for a German dating site, we learn<br \/>\nthat &#8220;123456&#8221; works 1.4% of the time and that 2.5% of all passwords<br \/>\nbegin with &#8220;1234.&#8221;  Interesting.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.heise.de\/newsticker\/meldung\/73396<\/p>\n<p>Bank defends its bad security by saying that everyone else does it, too.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/blogs.zdnet.com\/Ou\/?p=226<\/p>\n<p>Interesting essay about how EU law would treat the NSA&#8217;s collection of<br \/>\neveryone&#8217;s phone records.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.concurringopinions.com\/archives\/2006\/05\/the_nsa_phone_c.html<br \/>\nor http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/mpv6d<\/p>\n<p>Animated political cartoon on NSA eavesdropping.  And a song, too.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.newsday.com\/news\/opinion\/ny-wh-nsawiretapping,0,1906650.flash<br \/>\n  or http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/rg57v<\/p>\n<p>You can audit &#8220;Welcome to Practical Aspects of Modern Cryptography&#8221;:<br \/>\nUniversity of Washington, Winter 2006, by Josh Benaloh, Brian<br \/>\nLaMacchia, and John Manferdelli.  The course materials and videos of<br \/>\nthe lectures are online.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.cs.washington.edu\/education\/courses\/csep590\/06wi\/<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.cs.washington.edu\/education\/courses\/csep590\/06wi\/lectures\/<\/p>\n<p>Fascinating interview with a debit card scammer.  Moral: securing this<br \/>\nsystem isn&#8217;t going to be easy.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/smallworldpodcast.com\/?p=391<\/p>\n<p>And some comments from a fake ID salesman, in case you thought<br \/>\nhard-to-forge national ID cards would solve the problem:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/stories\/2006\/06\/02\/ap\/national\/mainD8I07PHG0.shtm<br \/>\nl or http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/rafve<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;How to Avoid Going to Jail under 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 for Lying to<br \/>\nGovernment Agents.&#8221;<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/library.findlaw.com\/2004\/May\/11\/147945.html<\/p>\n<p>Nice article discussing the hype, and reality, over the threat of<br \/>\nhomebrew chemical weapons.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.theregister.co.uk\/2006\/06\/04\/chemical_bioterror_analysis\/<\/p>\n<p>Just hide this gadget in someone&#8217;s car or briefcase &#8212; or maybe sew it<br \/>\ninto his coat &#8212; and then track his every move using GPS.  You have to<br \/>\nrecover the device to play it back, but presumably the next generation<br \/>\nwill be queryable remotely.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.thinkgeek.com\/gadgets\/security\/8212\/?cpg=cj<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. government is asking ISPs to save personal data about you, in<br \/>\ncase they need access to it.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.latimes.com\/technology\/la-fi-internet2jun02,0,622125.story?co<br \/>\nll=la-home-headlines or http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/zpzvz<br \/>\nNote that the Justice Department invoked two of the Four Horsemen of<br \/>\nthe Internet Apocalypse: child pornographers and terrorists.  If they<br \/>\ncan figure out how to work kidnappers and drug dealers in, they can<br \/>\nprobably do anything they want.<\/p>\n<p> From &#8220;Assassination in the United States: An Operational Study of<br \/>\nRecent Assassins, Attackers, and Near-Lethal Approachers,&#8221; (a 1999<br \/>\narticle published in the &#8220;Journal of Forensic Sciences&#8221;):  &#8220;Few<br \/>\nattackers or near-lethal approachers possessed the cunning or the<br \/>\nbravado of assassins in popular movies or novels.  The reality of<br \/>\nAmerican assassination is much more mundane, more banal than<br \/>\nassassinations depicted on the screen.  Neither monsters nor martyrs,<br \/>\nrecent American assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers<br \/>\nengaged in pre-incident patterns of thinking and behaviour.&#8221;  The quote<br \/>\nis from the last page.  The whole thing is interesting reading.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.secretservice.gov\/ntac\/ntac_jfs.pdf<\/p>\n<p>Interesting law review article by Helen Nissenbaum: &#8220;Privacy as<br \/>\nContextual Integrity.&#8221;<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/crypto.stanford.edu\/portia\/papers\/RevnissenbaumDTP31.pdf<\/p>\n<p>New directions in chemical warfare: chemicals that make enemy soldiers<br \/>\nsexually irresistible to each other, attract swarms of enraged wasps,<br \/>\nor cause &#8220;severe and lasting halitosis&#8221;:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.newscientist.com\/article.ns?id=mg18524823.800<br \/>\nTechnology always gets better; it never gets worse.  There will be a<br \/>\ntime, probably in our lifetimes, when weapons like these will be real.<\/p>\n<p>NSA surveillance cartoon:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.ibiblio.org\/Dave\/Dr-Fun\/df200605\/df20060517.jpg<\/p>\n<p>Interesting paper on the security of contactless smartcards:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.chi-publishing.com\/samples\/ISB0903HH.pdf<\/p>\n<p>Wireless surveillance camera detector:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.brickhousesecurity.com\/dd9000.html<\/p>\n<p>Great article comparing the barrier Israel is erecting to protect<br \/>\nitself from the West Bank with the hypothetical barrier the U.S. would<br \/>\nbuild to protect itself from Mexico: &#8220;No wonder the [Israeli] fence is<br \/>\nconsidered a good deal by those living on its western side. But<br \/>\napplying this model to the U.S.-Mexico border will not be easy. U.S.<br \/>\ncitizens will find it hard to justify such tough measures when their<br \/>\nonly goal is to stop people coming in for work &#8212; rather than<br \/>\npreventing them from trying to commit murder. And the cost will be more<br \/>\nimportant. It&#8217;s much easier to open your wallet when someone is<br \/>\nthreatening to blow up your local cafe.&#8221;<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.slate.com\/id\/2143104\/<\/p>\n<p>$1M VoIP scam:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.networkingpipeline.com\/news\/188702745<\/p>\n<p>NIST has just published &#8220;Recommendation for Random Number Generation<br \/>\nUsing Deterministic Random Bit Generators.&#8221;<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/csrc.nist.gov\/publications\/nistpubs\/index.html<\/p>\n<p>The NSA is combing through MySpace:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.newscientisttech.com\/article\/mg19025556.200-pentagon-sets-its<br \/>\n-sights-on-social-networking-websites.html or http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/fk3z6<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>      Hacking Computers Over USB<\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;ve previously written about the risks of small portable computing<br \/>\ndevices; how more and more data can be stored on them, and then lost or<br \/>\nstolen.  But there&#8217;s another risk: if an attacker can convince you to<br \/>\nplug his USB device into your computer, he can take it over.  From CSO<br \/>\nMagazine:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Plug an iPod or USB stick into a PC running Windows and the device can<br \/>\nliterally take over the machine and search for confidential documents,<br \/>\ncopy them back to the iPod or USB&#8217;s internal storage, and hide them as<br \/>\n&#8220;deleted&#8221; files. Alternatively, the device can simply plant spyware, or<br \/>\neven compromise the operating system. Two features that make this<br \/>\npossible are the Windows AutoRun facility and the ability of<br \/>\nperipherals to use something called direct memory access (DMA). The<br \/>\nfirst attack vector you can and should plug; the second vector is the<br \/>\nresult of a design flaw that&#8217;s likely to be with us for many years to<br \/>\ncome.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The article has the details, but basically you can configure a file on<br \/>\nyour USB device to automatically run when it&#8217;s plugged into a<br \/>\ncomputer.  That file can, of course, do anything you want it to.<\/p>\n<p>Recently I&#8217;ve been seeing more and more written about this attack.  The<br \/>\nSpring 2006 issue of 2600 Magazine, for example, contains a short<br \/>\narticle called &#8220;iPod Sneakiness&#8221; (unfortunately, not online).  The<br \/>\nauthor suggests that you can innocently ask someone at an Internet cafe<br \/>\nif you can plug your iPod into his computer to power it up &#8212; and then<br \/>\nsteal his passwords and critical files.<\/p>\n<p>And about someone used this trick in a penetration test:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;We figured we would try something different by baiting the same<br \/>\nemployees that were on high alert. We gathered all the worthless vendor<br \/>\ngiveaway thumb drives collected over the years and imprinted them with<br \/>\nour own special piece of software. I had one of my guys write a Trojan<br \/>\nthat, when run, would collect passwords, logins and machine-specific<br \/>\ninformation from the user&#8217;s computer, and then email the findings back<br \/>\nto us.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The next hurdle we had was getting the USB drives in the hands of the<br \/>\ncredit union&#8217;s internal users. I made my way to the credit union at<br \/>\nabout 6 a.m. to make sure no employees saw us. I then proceeded to<br \/>\nscatter the drives in the parking lot, smoking areas, and other areas<br \/>\nemployees frequented.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Once I seeded the USB drives, I decided to grab some coffee and watch<br \/>\nthe employees show up for work. Surveillance of the facility was worth<br \/>\nthe time involved. It was really amusing to watch the reaction of the<br \/>\nemployees who found a USB drive. You know they plugged them into their<br \/>\ncomputers the minute they got to their desks.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I immediately called my guy that wrote the Trojan and asked if<br \/>\nanything was received at his end. Slowly but surely info was being<br \/>\nmailed back to him. I would have loved to be on the inside of the<br \/>\nbuilding watching as people started plugging the USB drives in,<br \/>\nscouring through the planted image files, then unknowingly running our<br \/>\npiece of software.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>There is a partial defense.  From the first article:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;AutoRun is just a bad idea. People putting CD-ROMs or USB drives into<br \/>\ntheir computers usually want to see what&#8217;s on the media, not have<br \/>\nprograms automatically run. Fortunately you can turn AutoRun off. A<br \/>\nsimple manual approach is to hold down the &#8220;Shift&#8221; key when a disk or<br \/>\nUSB storage device is inserted into the computer. A better way is to<br \/>\ndisable the feature entirely by editing the Windows Registry. There are<br \/>\nmany instructions for doing this online (just search for &#8216;disable<br \/>\nautorun&#8217;) or you can download and use Microsoft&#8217;s TweakUI program,<br \/>\nwhich is part of the Windows XP PowerToys download. With Windows XP you<br \/>\ncan also disable AutoRun for CDs by right-clicking on the CD drive icon<br \/>\nin the Windows explorer, choosing the AutoPlay tab, and then selecting<br \/>\n&#8216;Take no action&#8217; for each kind of disk that&#8217;s listed. Unfortunately,<br \/>\ndisabling AutoPlay for CDs won&#8217;t always disable AutoPlay for USB<br \/>\ndevices, so the registry hack is the safest course of action.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>In the 1990s, the Macintosh operating system had this feature, which<br \/>\nwas removed after a virus made use of it in 1998.  Microsoft needs to<br \/>\nremove this feature as well.<\/p>\n<p>But it&#8217;s only a partial defense. In the penetration test, they didn&#8217;t<br \/>\nuse AutoRun.  They just created a sufficiently enticing file, and the<br \/>\npeople who found the USB drives manually invoked the executable.<\/p>\n<p>http:\/\/www.csoonline.com\/read\/050106\/ipods.html<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.darkreading.com\/document.asp?doc_id=95556&#038;WT.svl=column1_1<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.darkreading.com\/boards\/message.asp?msg_id=134658<\/p>\n<p>My previous essay:<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"xC59aCio2k\"><p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog\/archives\/2005\/07\/risks_of_losing.html\">Risks of Losing Portable Devices<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" style=\"position: absolute; clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);\" title=\"&#8220;Risks of Losing Portable Devices&#8221; &#8212; Schneier on Security\" src=\"https:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog\/archives\/2005\/07\/risks_of_losing.html\/embed\/#?secret=fnWwNBcxN6#?secret=xC59aCio2k\" data-secret=\"xC59aCio2k\" width=\"540\" height=\"304\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>      The Doghouse: KRYPTO 2.0<\/p>\n<p>The website is hysterical:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Proof of the Krypto security !<br \/>\nWhich would be, if one would try one of Krypto coded file unauthorized<br \/>\nto decode.<br \/>\nA coded file with the length of 18033 indications has therefore<br \/>\naccording to computation, 256 bits highly 18033 indications =<br \/>\n6,184355814363201353319227173630\u00c3\u00ab+43427<br \/>\nfile possibilities. Each file possibility has exactly 18033 indications<br \/>\nbyte.<br \/>\nMultiplied by the number of file possibilities then need results in the<br \/>\nmemory.<br \/>\nThose are then: 1,1152248840041161000440562362208e+43432 byte.<br \/>\nThose are then: 1,038634110245961789082788150963\u00c3\u00a8+43423 Giga byte data<br \/>\nquantity.<br \/>\nThat is a number with 43424 places.<br \/>\nI can surely maintain as much memory place give it in the whole world<br \/>\nnot never.<br \/>\nAnd the head problem now is, which is now the correctly decoded file.<br \/>\nWho it does not know can only say there. That does not know so exactly !<br \/>\nThey can code naturally naturally also still successively several<br \/>\ntimes, even up to<br \/>\nthe infinity.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Machine translated (on the website; not by me) from German into<br \/>\nEnglish.  My head hurts just trying to read that.<\/p>\n<p>http:\/\/kryptochef.net\/index2e.htm<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>      Counterpane News<\/p>\n<p>Schneier is speaking at the FIRST Conference in Baltimore on June 30:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.first.org\/conference\/2006\/<\/p>\n<p>Interview with Bruce Schneier:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.sevendaysvt.com\/features\/2006\/tales-from-the-cryptographer.html<\/p>\n<p>Counterpane announced two pretty cool service agreements:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.counterpane.com\/pr-20060605.html<\/p>\n<p>Network World wrote about Counterpane at the Gartner Security Conference:<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.networkworld.com\/news\/2006\/060506-gartner-security.html<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>      Aligning Interest with Capability<\/p>\n<p>Have you ever been to a retail store and seen this sign on the<br \/>\nregister:  &#8220;Your purchase free if you don&#8217;t get a receipt&#8221;?  You almost<br \/>\ncertainly didn&#8217;t see it in an expensive or high-end store.  You saw it<br \/>\nin a convenience store, or a fast-food restaurant, or maybe a liquor<br \/>\nstore.  That sign is a security device, and a clever one at that.  And<br \/>\nit illustrates a very important rule about security: it works best when<br \/>\nyou align interests with capability.<\/p>\n<p>If you&#8217;re a store owner, one of your security worries is employee<br \/>\ntheft.  Your employees handle cash all day, and dishonest ones will<br \/>\npocket some of it for themselves.  The history of the cash register is<br \/>\nmostly a history of preventing this kind of theft.  Early cash<br \/>\nregisters were just boxes with a bell attached.  The bell rang when an<br \/>\nemployee opened the box, alerting the store owner &#8212; who was presumably<br \/>\nelsewhere in the store &#8212; that an employee was handling money.<\/p>\n<p>The register tape was an important development in security against<br \/>\nemployee theft.  Every transaction is recorded in write-only media, in<br \/>\nsuch a way that it&#8217;s impossible to insert or delete transactions.  It&#8217;s<br \/>\nan audit trail.  Using that audit trail, the store owner can count the<br \/>\ncash in the drawer, and compare the amount with the register tape.  Any<br \/>\ndiscrepancies can be docked from the employee&#8217;s paycheck.<\/p>\n<p>If you&#8217;re a dishonest employee, you have to keep transactions off the<br \/>\nregister.  If someone hands you money for an item and walks out, you<br \/>\ncan pocket that money without anyone being the wiser.  And, in fact,<br \/>\nthat&#8217;s how employees steal cash in retail stores.<\/p>\n<p>What can the store owner do?  He can stand there and watch the<br \/>\nemployee, of course.  But that&#8217;s not very efficient; the whole point of<br \/>\nhaving employees is so that the store owner can do other things.  The<br \/>\ncustomer is standing there anyway, but the customer doesn&#8217;t care one<br \/>\nway or another about a receipt.<\/p>\n<p>So here&#8217;s what the employer does: he hires the customer.  By putting up<br \/>\na sign saying &#8220;Your purchase free if you don&#8217;t get a receipt,&#8221; the<br \/>\nemployer is getting the customer to guard the employee.  The customer<br \/>\nmakes sure the employee gives him a receipt, and employee theft is<br \/>\nreduced accordingly.<\/p>\n<p>There is a general rule in security to align interest with<br \/>\ncapability.  The customer has the capability of watching the employee;<br \/>\nthe sign gives him the interest.<\/p>\n<p>In Beyond Fear, I wrote about ATM fraud; you can see the same mechanism<br \/>\nat work:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;When ATM cardholders in the US complained about phantom withdrawals<br \/>\nfrom their accounts, the courts generally held that the banks had to<br \/>\nprove fraud. Hence, the banks&#8217; agenda was to improve security and keep<br \/>\nfraud low, because they paid the costs of any fraud. In the UK, the<br \/>\nreverse was true: The courts generally sided with the banks and assumed<br \/>\nthat any attempts to repudiate withdrawals were cardholder fraud, and<br \/>\nthe cardholder had to prove otherwise. This caused the banks to have<br \/>\nthe opposite agenda; they didn&#8217;t care about improving security, because<br \/>\nthey were content to blame the problems on the customers and send them<br \/>\nto jail for complaining. The result was that in the US, the banks<br \/>\nimproved ATM security to forestall additional losses&#8211;most of the fraud<br \/>\nactually was not the cardholder&#8217;s fault &#8212; while in the UK, the banks<br \/>\ndid nothing.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The banks had the capability to improve security.  In the US, they also<br \/>\nhad the interest.  But in the UK, only the customer had the<br \/>\ninterest.  It wasn&#8217;t until the UK courts reversed themselves and<br \/>\naligned interest with capability that ATM security improved.<\/p>\n<p>Computer security is no different.  For years I have argued in favor of<br \/>\nsoftware liabilities.  Software vendors are in the best position to<br \/>\nimprove software security; they have the capability.  But,<br \/>\nunfortunately, they don&#8217;t have much interest.  Features, schedule, and<br \/>\nprofitability are far more important.  Software liabilities will change<br \/>\nthat.  They&#8217;ll align interest with capability, and they&#8217;ll improve<br \/>\nsoftware security.<\/p>\n<p>One last story.  In Italy, tax fraud used to be a national hobby.  (It<br \/>\nmay still be; I don&#8217;t know.)  The government was tired of retail stores<br \/>\nnot reporting sales and paying taxes, so they passed a law regulating<br \/>\nthe customers.  Any customer having just purchased an item and stopped<br \/>\nwithin a certain distance of a retail store, had to produce a receipt<br \/>\nor they would be fined.  Just as in the &#8220;Your purchase free if you<br \/>\ndon&#8217;t get a receipt&#8221; story, the law turned the customers into tax<br \/>\ninspectors.  They demanded receipts from merchants, which in turn<br \/>\nforced the merchants to create a paper audit trail for the purchase and<br \/>\npay the required tax.<\/p>\n<p>This was a great idea, but it didn&#8217;t work very well.  Customers,<br \/>\nespecially tourists, didn&#8217;t like to be stopped by police.  People<br \/>\nstarted demanding that the police prove they just purchased the<br \/>\nitem.  Threatening people with fines if they didn&#8217;t guard merchants<br \/>\nwasn&#8217;t as effective an enticement as offering people a reward if they<br \/>\ndidn&#8217;t get a receipt.<\/p>\n<p>Interest must be aligned with capability, but you need to be careful<br \/>\nhow you generate interest.<\/p>\n<p>This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.<br \/>\nhttp:\/\/www.wired.com\/news\/columns\/0,71032-0.html<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>      Comments from Readers<\/p>\n<p>There are hundreds of comments &#8212; many of them interesting &#8212; on these<br \/>\ntopics on my blog. Search for the story you want to comment on, and<br \/>\njoin in.<\/p>\n<p>http:\/\/www.schneier.com\/blog<\/p>\n<p>** *** ***** ******* *********** *************<\/p>\n<p>CRYPTO-GRAM is a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses,<br \/>\ninsights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.  You<br \/>\ncan subscribe, unsubscribe, or change your address on the Web at<br \/>\n<http:\/\/www.schneier.com\/crypto-gram.html>.  Back issues are also<br \/>\navailable at that URL.<\/p>\n<p>Comments on CRYPTO-GRAM should be sent to<br \/>\nschneier@counterpane.com.  Permission to print comments is assumed<br \/>\nunless otherwise stated.  Comments may be edited for length and clarity.<\/p>\n<p>Please feel free to forward CRYPTO-GRAM to colleagues and friends who<br \/>\nwill find it valuable.  Permission is granted to reprint CRYPTO-GRAM,<br \/>\nas long as it is reprinted in its entirety.<\/p>\n<p>CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier.  Schneier is the author of<br \/>\nthe best sellers &#8220;Beyond Fear,&#8221; &#8220;Secrets and Lies,&#8221; and &#8220;Applied<br \/>\nCryptography,&#8221; and an inventor of the Blowfish and Twofish<br \/>\nalgorithms.  He is founder and CTO of Counterpane Internet Security<br \/>\nInc., and is a member of the Advisory Board of the Electronic Privacy<br \/>\nInformation Center (EPIC).  He is a frequent writer and lecturer on<br \/>\nsecurity topics.  See <http:\/\/www.schneier.com>.<\/p>\n<p>Counterpane is the world&#8217;s leading protector of networked information &#8211;<br \/>\nthe inventor of outsourced security monitoring and the foremost<br \/>\nauthority on effective mitigation of emerging IT threats. Counterpane<br \/>\nprotects networks for Fortune 1000 companies and governments<br \/>\nworld-wide.  See <http:\/\/www.counterpane.com>.<\/p>\n<p>Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter.  Opinions expressed are not<br \/>\nnecessarily those of Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.<\/p>\n<p>Copyright (c) 2006 by Bruce Schneier.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p> [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-60","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-security"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":68,"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60\/revisions\/68"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.szmidt.org\/blog2\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}